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If either property rights or institutions are weak, agents who cre-
ate wealth by cooperating will later have an incentive to fight over the
distribution of it. In this paper we investigate theoretically and experi-
mentally the circumstances under which welfare losses from investment
in distributional contests destroy welfare gains from voluntary coop-
eration. We find that in situations, where the return to cooperation
is high, subjects cooperate strongly and welfare exceeds the predicted
non-cooperation levels. If returns to cooperation are low, then subjects
still cooperate, but the resources wasted in the distributional conflict
lead to lower welfare than if subjects had followed the theoretical pre-
diction of not cooperating.
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1 Introduction
Whenever the cooperation of individuals generates surpluses for which no
well defined property rights exist, a distributive conflict might arise. If ra-
tional actors foresee that the distributive conflict could become very severe
they might refrain from cooperating in the first place. This creates a hold-up
problem. However, one can also imagine that actors do not foresee the dam-
aging nature of distributive conflict over the surplus created by cooperation,
such that they end up worse off than if they had not cooperated at all. Some
historical examples like the Balkan conflict, the Aceh wars or the Sri Lankan
civil war come to mind. Initial cooperation and the following conflict or civil
war left these regions much worse off.1 The same phenomenon is observed
in other, smaller environments. After a bitter divorce battle the parties are
often worse off than before they entered a marriage. The same is true for
many joint ventures in the business world that have gone sour. This is even
more often the case in criminal joint ventures, where property rights are
not enforceable at all. Distributive conflicts over the proceeds from criminal
activity often lead to considerable collateral damage.2
The contribution of this paper is a clean investigation of the impact of
cooperation and consecutive fighting for its proceeds on welfare. Compared
to other studies our main methodological advancement is that we are shut-
ting down other mechanisms that could have an impact on welfare. In order
to achieve this, we develop a simple model capturing the essence of the
problem. The empirical evaluation is made possible by taking the model to
the laboratory. Our study is in the spirit of other recent papers that use
laboratory experiments with contests in order to study conflict situations
(like Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2013, 2014; Kimbrough et al., 2014).
Our simple model has two stages. In stage one two players invest simul-
taneously into a group project, where the resulting value of the project is
a multiple of the total investment. In stage two, after observing the total
value of the group project, players simultaneously exert costly effort with
the aim to secure a share of the created value. The share a player receives
is equal to her share of total efforts exerted.
1See Hirshleifer (2001), Grossman (1991, 1999), Grossman and Kim (1995) and Collier
and Hoeffl er (2004) for theories on the impact of material objectives on violent conflicts
and civil wars. See also the econometric study and the case studies in Sambanis and
Collier (2005a,b) for a comprehensive investigation of “greed versus grievance”as causes
of civil wars, which shows that material objectives are important.
2For a beautiful dramatic illustration of this mechanism at work, watch the movie “The
Treasure of the Sierra Madre”with Humphrey Bogard, which was suggested to me by Phil
Grossman.
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First, we analyse a situation, where initial investment does not restrict
the amount of effort available in the distributional contest. This is the case
if, e.g., investment and effort are not taken from the same budget. One can
think of situations, where efforts are physical and investments are financial
or vice versa. Examples are illegal joint ventures such as drug syndicates
with violent distributional battles or group production with court battles
over the distribution of the returns. Cooperative investments does also not
reduce the budget available for fighting in cases where both investments and
efforts are financial but the maximum investment is small compared to the
total budget. Take multinationals investing in a joint venture for example.
There the maximum amount reasonably invested in a joint venture is often
small compared to the total assets of a firm. Then investing an extra Dollar
into the joint venture will not significantly reduce the resources available for
a potential court battle over the proceeds.
Our analysis shows that up to very high social returns for contributions
a rational player would not cooperate (i.e. invest in the group project). We
know from many experimental studies that subjects often cooperate in so-
cial dilemmas, though (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). It is interesting
to explore the consequences for subjects that cooperate in the investment
stage. For low social returns cooperation is actually welfare damaging when
followed by optimal efforts, since the resources burned in the contest are
greater than the surplus created from cooperating. Cooperation in the in-
vestment stage is only welfare enhancing if followed by efforts well below the
equilibrium level. For higher social returns cooperation followed by equilib-
rium efforts is welfare increasing but still not individually rational.
The insight that the inability to commit to not fighting in the future is
a major cause of a severe hold-up problem motivates a variant of our model
with constrained fighting efforts. Here the players have to finance their
investment and their fighting effort from the same limited pool of resources.
This is not only of theoretical interest but also describes many real world
situations. For example, in contrast to multinationals, venture capitalists
often only raise a certain amount of capital they can use in a joint venture.
The investment into the joint venture and also potential fees for lawyers in
subsequent distributive conflicts have to be paid out of it. Sports is another
area where both investments into the joint project and efforts to secure the
largest share of the proceeds come from the same pool of resources. Players
have to invest from their pool of physical stamina into the team success as
well as into their own fame, which influences the share of the team surplus
they receive through salaries, etc. A more specific example are break-aways
in cycling. Riders in a breakaway have to use their legs when cooperating
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with the aim to stay away from the peleton. However, they will lack the
power expended, when the final sprint comes along, which decides who wins
and who gets how much of the prize money.
While the same zero-contribution equilibrium as in the unconstrained
case exists for the same range of social returns, the resource constraint also
allows for other more effi cient equilibria. The intuition is the following: if
both players invest a relatively high level of their resources into the joint
project then they cannot fight very hard anymore as they do not have much
resources left. This might make investing worthwhile. Investing the full
endowment is not an equilibrium though, as then the opponent could invest
a little less and steal the whole surplus with a little bit of effort.
With these theoretical predictions in hand we implement a two-by-two
experimental design in the laboratory. We vary the marginal social return to
investment (low vs. high). On the other dimension we vary if the efforts in
the conflict stage have to come out of the same endowment as the first-stage
investment (constrained vs. unconstrained). We find in contrast to much of
the contest literature that subjects’average efforts are remarkably close to
equilibrium. As subjects —this time contrary to equilibrium predictions —
also contribute, we observe welfare damaging play in the low return treat-
ments. Subjects learn with repetition and reduce their contributions such
that the welfare losses become small in the final stages of the experiment.
For high social returns without constraints on effort, subjects overcome the
social dilemma and social welfare is about 50 percent above the prediction.
In the constrained case subjects also make positive contributions. These are
lower than in the unconstrained case, as subjects are careful not to become
defenseless in the distributive conflict. The lower resulting efforts cannot
fully compensate for the lower surplus generated and so contrary to the
theoretical prediction welfare is lower than in the unconstrained case. The
constraints, on the one hand, are useful to limit welfare reducing cooperation
when the social return to cooperation is low. On the other hand, constraints
are hindering subjects to fully realize welfare gains from cooperation when
the returns are high.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section
lays out the underlying model and derives equilibrium predictions. Section
3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 reports and discusses our
results. We end with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
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2 The model
In what follows we lay out our model. We combine a simple version of a
cooperation game (a linear two-player voluntary contribution mechanism)
with the simplest version of a distributional contest (a two-player Tullock
contest, Tullock 1980). In the first stage, players voluntarily invest in a group
project. Then in the second stage, after observing the value of the group
project, players simultaneously exert costly effort in a distributive contest.
The share of value from the group project a player receives is proportional
to the ratio of her own effort to the total effort exerted.
Implicitly, our setup assumes that players cannot commit to parting
amicably without fighting. Also binding contracts specifying amicable splits
are not possible. Hence, our model captures situations, where there exists
an inherent temptation to fight for a larger part of the pie. This does not
mean that a fifty-fifty split without fighting is impossible in our model, since
both parties not exerting any effort would accomplish this.3
We denote player i′s investment in the group project as ci and her effort
exerted in the contest as ei. Further we denote a player’s endowment as C,
the value of the group project as V (ci, cj) and the value share accruing to i
as ρi(ei, ej). Given this notation we can write the profit of player i as:
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Ui(ci, cj , ei, ej) := C + ρi(ei, ej)V (ci, cj)− ci − ei (1)
ci, cj ∈ [0, C]
ei, ej ∈ [0,∞]





if ei + ej > 0
1/2 if ei + ej = 0
.
The value of the group project depends linearly on the investments and on
the marginal social return to investment, MSRI, which we denote by φ :
V (ci, cj) := φ(ci + cj).
3A referee pointed out that this feature of the model is quite helpful for the analysis of
the data, since efforts do not suffer from the selection bias that would arise if they were
only observed conditional on the previous decision to fight.
4We normalise the marginal cost (measured as a money equivalent) for both effort and
investment to one.
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We opted for a linear VCM for two reasons. Firstly, the wide use of lin-
ear VCMs in the literature allows a direct comparison of results. Secondly,
and more importantly, a linear VCM is much easier to understand for ex-
perimental subjects than a non-linear version. Since we already have a stage
with non-linear profits in the Tullock contest, keeping the cooperation stage
as simple as possible is a sensible way to ensure that subjects understand
the payoff structure.
With respect to the effort in the distributional contest different scenarios
are imaginable. The effort could be either taken from the same resources
as the investment (e.g. wealth invested in a joint venture and expenditure
for lawyers in the fight for the proceeds) or from a different source (e.g.
investment could be monetary and investment could be physical or time,
etc.). We will consider both cases.
Definition 1 In what follows we will look at two scenarios with regard to
the strategy space for effort.
a) We speak of the unconstrained case if the admissible action spaces are
ci ∈ [0, C], i ∈ {1, 2}
ei ∈ [0,∞], i ∈ {1, 2}
b) We speak of the constrained case if
ci ∈ [0, C], i ∈ {1, 2}
ei ∈ [0, C − ci], i ∈ {1, 2} .
It is easy to see that social effi ciency requires zero efforts, since efforts
are costly and only decide over distribution. Adding up the payoffs of both
players gives
Ui + Uj = 2C + φ(ci + cj)− ci − cj − ei − ej , (2)
which also shows that full investment is socially effi cient as long as φ > 1.
This is true independently of the existence or absence of constraints on the
efforts.
Proposition 1 The social effi cient contributions and efforts for both cases




0 if φ < 1
∈ [0, C] if φ = 1
C if φ > 1.
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2.1 Equilibrium in the unconstrained case
We use Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium as the solution concept. Any
possible pair of initial investments induces a separate subgame. For given
initial investments the best response for player i in stage two is determined
by the first-order condition
∂
∂ei
Ui(V, ei, ej) =
ej
(ei + ej)2
V − 1 = 0.
Observe that player i and j′s first-order conditions are symmetric. Solving
yields:
e∗i (V ) = e
∗
j (V ) = V/4.
Now move to the first stage. The expected payoffof player i, who anticipates
equilibrium play in the second stage, becomes:5








(ci + cj)− ci.
It is easy to see that player i chooses to contribute her full endowment C if
φ > 4, while she does not contribute anything if φ < 4.We get the following
subgame-perfect equilibrium for the unconstrained case.





(ci + cj) (3)
c∗i =

0 if φ < 4
∈ [0, C] if φ = 4
C if φ > 4
In order to have a benchmark for what would happen in a world without
distributional conflict, consider the case where ei and ej are constrained to
be zero. Then the resulting game is equivalent to a two player voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM) for a public good with the marginal private
return (MPR) of φ/2. There socially beneficial investment is an equilibrium if
φ ≥ 2. Therefore, for φ ∈ (2, 4) the anticipated distributional fight in theory
prevents cooperation that would appear if the distribution of the proceeds
5e∗i and e
∗
j are shorthand for e
∗
i (ci, cj) and e
∗
j (ci, cj), respectively.
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were enforced without conflict by a third party or by strong property rights.
We have a hold-up problem.
A vast amount of experimental studies have shown that humans to a
certain extend cooperate even if the MPR is below unity as long as the
marginal social return φ is greater than one.6 Such a situation occurs in
our case if φ ∈ (1, 2) and if efforts are restricted to zero. There is an
interesting empirical questions arising from the comparison of our strategic
game to the standard VCM game. How strong do incentives have to be
to induce cooperation in our model, where the proceeds from cooperation
have to be fought for? Do subjects cooperate when φ ∈ (1, 2), as they
do in the normal VCM game with the equivalent marginal private return?
Do subjects cooperate in the case where in the VCM with an equivalent
MPR full cooperation is an equilibrium, while it is not in our game (i.e. for
φ ∈ [2, 4)) with a conflict stage?
In the standard VCM with an effi ciency factor that creates a social
dilemma, subjects’ contributions are beneficial for social welfare. This is
not necessarily the case in an environment where the proceeds from coop-
eration will be fought over. Observe that an increase in the contribution
increases the prize for the following contest and therefore the incentive to
expend resources in the fight for a share of the prize. Suppose that subjects
play the contest stage according to SPNE and foresee this. The following
question arises: for which parameter values is the remaining reduced game
still a social dilemma, in which cooperation is socially beneficial but not
individually rational?
Remark 2 If we assume that players exert equilibrium efforts e∗i = e
∗
j =
φ(ci + cj)/4, then the reduced game is a social dilemma whenever φ ∈ (2, 4).
To see this, take the individual payoff from (1) and the joint payoff from
(2) and substitute in the optimal effort to obtain
Ui = C + φ(ci + cj)/4− ci
Ui + Uj = 2C + φ(ci + cj)/2− ci − cj






− 1 < 0, and





− 1 > 0,
6See Ledyard (1995) for a survey of the early literature and Chaudhuri (2011) for a
recent survey of the dynamics of cooperation.
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which is the case if φ ∈ (2, 4).
2.2 Equilibrium in the constrained case
If a player has to finance his investment and fighting effort from the same
budget C, then we are in case b) from Definition 1. Solving backwards, it
becomes clear that for low initial investments the constraint does not come
into play and the subgame-perfect continuation follows equation (3). This
is the case for player i whenever
C − ci ≥
φ
4
(ci + cj) ∀i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Note that the critical player is the player who has a lower budget left after
investing. If the player who invested more in the first stage has still enough
funds to exert effort e∗ then the other player has also enough funds left.
Taking this into account and solving the inequality above results in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The subgame-perfect continuation efforts are
〈
φ
4 (ci + cj),
φ














In a next step we establish that a player, who is constrained, prefers
the maximum effort possible to any other lower effort given the effort of
the opponent. Observe that the marginal benefit of increasing the effort is
positive for all efforts below the best-response effort as i′s objective function
is concave in ei.7 It follows that the best response to an effort that leaves a
player constrained is the maximum effort available:




V ej − ej
}
. (5)
Further observe that only the increasing part of the best-response corre-
spondence comes into play, as the unconstrained best-response correspon-
dence increases up to the unconstrained equilibrium continuation at V/4
and greater efforts are strictly dominated. Existence of the subgame-perfect
continuation is not a problem, since best-responses are continuous on the
relevant compact domain [0, V/4]. We can now establish that the player
with less resources left in a subgame-perfect continuation will always fully
exhaust the remaining resources if the constraint is binding, while the player
with more resources best-responds to this.8
7This is the case as ∂2Ui/∂e2i = −2ejV/(ei + ej)3.
8This result has been derived before by Che and Gale (1997).
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then in the subgame-perfect continuation we have




C − cj ,
√




In a next step we show that we can rule out the existence of asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibria.
Lemma 3 For φ 6= 4 no SPNE in pure strategies exists, where c∗i 6= c∗j .
Proof. See appendix.
The Lemma above guarantees that we can concentrate on symmetric
equilibria. We will have two different equilibria: one that corresponds to
the non-cooperation equilibrium found in the unconstrained case for φ <
4 and an equilibrium, where players divide their investment evenly across
cooperation and fighting.





e∗j = 0 exists.
Proof. See appendix.
We now turn to the case where players invest positive amounts. A first
conjecture could be that there exist some equilibria with positive investment
for φ > 4. While this conjecture is correct, the condition φ > 4 is not
necessary.





j = C/2 if φ ≥ 8/3.
Proof. See appendix.
There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium for effi ciency factors for
which we have both pure-strategy equilibria. In this mixed strategy equilib-
rium players randomize between choosing ci = 0 and ci = C/2. For a player
to be indifferent between the two strategies we require a specific probability
µj with which the other player chooses C/2.
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Proposition 5 For φ ∈ (8/3, 4) there exists a mixed-strategy Nash Equilib-




and zero with probability 1− µ.
Proof. We require player j to make player i indifferent:













C (4 + φ)
8
= µj





2 (φ− 2) .
Symmetry ensures µi = µj .
Social welfare increases in the mixed-strategy equilibrium with µ, since
investments are socially beneficial.9 Expected social welfare in the Nash







φ− 2 − φ
)
. (6)
Somewhat counter-intuitively social welfare in this equilibrium is monoto-
nously decreasing in the effi ciency of investment φ.
2.3 Welfare predictions
Comparing the predicted social welfare across the two different situations
(constrained and unconstrained), shows that there exists an interval of the
investment effi ciency, where equilibrium welfare can be higher in the con-
strained case. For φ ∈ (8/3, 4) in the unconstrained case only a zero con-
tribution equilibrium exists, while in the constrained case also equilibria
exist, where players contribute half their endowment with positive proba-
bility. The expected welfare in these equilibria is greater than in the zero-
contribution equilibrium. For all other parameter values of φ the predicted
welfare is the same in both conditions. Figure 1 plots the ratio of expected
welfare to the value of the endowments. Values of above one represent
gains from cooperation. The solid line represents equilibria that yield the
9Observe that the welfare W increases with the number of players investing C/2, since
W (0, 0) = 2C, W (C/2, 0) =W (0, C/2) = C(3/2 + φ/4) and W (C/2, C/2) = Cφ.
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same welfare in the constrained and unconstrained case. The dashed lines
represent the higher welfare in the constrained case from the pure-strategy
equilibrium (the straight increasing line) and from the mixed-strategy equi-
librium (the convex and decreasing line).
W





Figure 1: Welfare predictions
From public-goods experiments we know that humans regularly cooper-
ate to a certain extent in social dilemma situations despite of the dominant
strategy not to do so. In what follows we engage in a thought experiment.
Assume that subjects expect and execute equilibrium play in the contest
phase. Under this assumption we can check if then the contribution stage
still constitutes a social dilemma. Clearly, for the constrained case with
φ ∈ (8/3, 4) this is not the case, since there are two equilibria with positive
contributions. The game has become a coordination game. 10
For the unconstrained case things are straight-forward and we have es-
tablished in Proposition 1 that the reduced game is a social dilemma for
φ ∈ (2, 4). This implies that contributing if φ < 2 is only welfare enhanc-
ing if in the second stage subjects can manage to reduce efforts below the
equilibrium level. Otherwise, the increase in the value of the joint project
due to an increased contribution is overcompensated by the wasted effort in
the distributional contest induced by the increase in the value. In contrast,
10For φ ∈ (1, 8/3) we still have a social dilemma. However, the marginal social return
of a unit of contribution only becomes positive for large contributions (i.e. when the
constraints are binding).
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in the case of φ ∈ (2, 4) an increased contribution leads to a larger increase
in the value of the joint project than in the resources wasted in the contest.
Therefore, contributions in this case over-all improve welfare, even if in the
contest stage optimal efforts are chosen. Note that a rational and purely
selfish player still does not have an incentive to contribute, as the expected
private return of the contribution is negative.
3 Experimental design
Given the theoretical treatment above, four sub-cases are of major interest.
First we want to test if there is a tendency for subjects to invest in the
project in a case where it could damage over-all welfare. For this reason we
require a treatment with φ < 2, where in the unconstrained case optimal
efforts wipe out more welfare than the contributions create. We choose a
factor of φ = 1.6.11We complement the treatment with unconstrained efforts
by one where both contributions and efforts have to be financed by the same
endowment. This will help answering the question if constraints on the war
chest mitigate the problem of welfare damaging contributions. These treat-
ments with low effi ciency factors will be referred to as unconstrained_low
and constrained_low.
Our second case of interest is that of a high social return to contributions.
There, in the unconstrained case higher contributions are social-welfare en-
hancing, but not individually rational (for φ < 4). Theoretically, in the
constrained case with the same effi ciency factor (for φ ∈ (8/3, 4)) welfare
should be weakly higher, as beyond the no-contribution equilibrium two
others featuring positive contributions exist. If we take into account that
subjects might be able to overcome the social dilemma in the unconstrained
case, then the expected welfare ranking could be reversed, as subjects do
not have to keep resources for fighting in reserve. We run two treatments
with an effi ciency factor of φ = 3 and denote them by unconstrained_high
and constrained_high. Table 1 summarises the treatments and reports the
equilibrium predictions. Note that we have multiple equilibria in the con-
strained_high treatment. So we report the two different contribution and
the three different effort levels that might be observed in equilibrium.
In all four treatments we set the endowment to C = 20. Subjects played
20 of the two-stage games each. The treatments were computerised and
11Note that φ = 1.6 corresponds to a VCM with private return of 0.8 if subjects disregard
the following contest. In two-player VCM’s with a private return of 0.8 subjects contribute
substantial amounts (see the control treatment in Bayer (ming)).
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unconstrained constrained
high φ = 3; ci ∈ [0, 20] ; ei ≥ 0 φ = 3; ci + ei ∈ [0, 20] ; ci, ei ≥ 0
c∗i , e
∗
i = 0 c
∗
i ∈ {0, 10}, e∗i ∈ {0, 7.5, 10}
low φ = 1.6, ci ∈ [0, 20] , ei ≥ 0 φ = 1.6; ci + ei ∈ [0, 20] ; ci, ei ≥ 0
c∗i , e
∗






programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
For each treatment we ran five sessions with between 18 and 24 sub-
jects. We employed a stranger design, i.e. after each period new groups of
two were randomly determined. In two sessions per treatment the matching
pool consisted of all subjects in the session. In the remaining three sessions
we formed subgroups of six subjects that were randomly re-matched to each
other. With the creation of the smaller matching groups we are able to
obtain a reasonable number of independent observations.12 Over all, 512
subjects participated in our experiments.13 Subjects were recruited using
ORSEE (Greiner, 2003). The participants were mainly students (under-
graduate and postgraduate) of the University of Adelaide and other South
Australian universities. Experimental earnings were exchanged for Aus-
tralian Dollars at the end of the session. On average, subjects earned a bit
more than 20 Australian Dollars (slightly below $20 US at the time of the
experiments). The experiment, including the reading of the instructions and
payment, took about one hour.
4 Results
In what follows we will present our main results. First, we look for treatment
effects with respect to social welfare. Then we will dig deeper and identify
the underlying drivers of these treatment effects.
12Comparing the distributions of key variables such as contributions, efforts and pay-
offs of the sessions with matching subgroups to those without does not yield significant
differences.
13 In the main four treatments we had 444 subjects. The remainder participated in
two additional treatments that investigate, why we did not observe excessive efforts as
documented in many other papers. See Section 4.2.3.
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4.1 Social Welfare
In our setting the average social welfare in a treatment is given by the aver-
age profit subjects earn in this treatment. Standard theory predicts that we
will observe the same welfare in three of the treatments (unconstrained_high,
unconstrained_low and constrained_low). In all of these the unique equi-
librium entails zero contributions and zero efforts with the consequence that
all subjects make a profit of 20 Experimental Currency Units per period (i.e.
they keep their endowment). In the remaining treatment (constrained_high)
besides the zero-contribution equilibrium there exist two other, more effi cient
equilibria. In the most effi cient equilibrium subjects evenly split their en-
dowment on contributions and efforts, which would result in a profit of 30
ECU. In the remaining mixed strategy equilibrium on average the payoff is













0 5 10 15 20
Period
low, unconstrained low, constrained
high, unconstrained high constrained
Figure 2: Average profit by treatment and period
Figure 2 plots the average profit for the different treatments across
15
rounds and demonstrates a strong treatment effect. Individual average prof-
its are greater in the high than in the low effi ciency treatments (p < 0.01 for
all pair-wise treatment comparisons, M-W tests on payoffs averaged over all
rounds and subjects within a matching group). Within an effi ciency level,
subjects being constrained has differential effects on individual payoffs. Con-
straint subjects have lower profits compared to the unconstrained ones if the
effi ciency factor is high (p < 0.06, M-W test, two-sided). This clearly con-
tradicts the theoretical predictions, as only in the constrained case equilibria
exist with positive welfare improving investments. If the effi ciency factor is
low, then the constraint on efforts tends to improve profits (p < 0.055,M-W
test, two-sided), while theory would predict no difference.14
Next we compare the average profit made in the treatments to the pre-
dicted profits. Table 2 shows the results from one-sided median tests on the
basis of profits averaged across all individuals within an independent ob-
servation and all periods.15 We see that subjects in the unconstrained_low
treatment made less profit then they would have made if they had not co-
operated at all as prescribed by equilibrium. The same is true for the con-
strained_low treatment. This difference is significant due to the very small
variation across independent observations (the 13 independent observations
all lie between 18.5 and 20.2). The quantitative deviation from equilib-
rium profits is small though. In the unconstrained_high treatment, where
conditional on subgame-perfect efforts contributing improves surpluses, sub-
jects did significantly better than in the unique non-cooperation equilibrium.
Subjects were able to overcome the hold-up problem to some extent. In
the constrained_high treatment, the profits sit somewhere between the pre-
diction for the best equilibrium, where the endowment is equally shared
between cooperative investment and fighting, and the mixed-strategy equi-
librium. These results remain unaltered if we either consider only the last
ten or just the last period. This shows that our findings are not driven by
early rounds, where subjects might still exhibit a considerable amount of
confusion.
14Considering that we only have 13 to 14 independent observations per treatment the
results are surprisingly strong. A random-effect panel that exploits all individual variation,
allows for clustering on the level of an independent observation, and controls for period
effects and demographics confirms the results.
15 It is quite tricky to come up with a valid test here, since it is unclear what an ap-
propriate distribution under the null hypotheses would be. The median test does not
make specific assumptions on the distribution but requires that values above and below
the median can be observed. Moreover the test results cannot be interpreted in terms of
average effi ciency if the distribution is asymmetric.
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Treatment H0 average p-value Remark
unc_low profit = 20 18.78 p < 0.01 less effi cient than predicted
con_low profit = 20 19.38 p < 0.01 less effi cient than predicted
unc_high profit = 20 30.25 p < 0.01 more effi cient than predicted
profit = 20 p < 0.01 more effi cient than in worst equilibrium
con_high profit = 22.5 27.77 p < 0.01 more effi cient than in mixed equilibrium
profit = 30 p < 0.01 less effi cient than in best equilibrium
Table 2: Testing effi ciency differences compared to prediction
4.2 Contributions and efforts
There are two elements that drive social welfare: contributions have a posi-
tive effect and efforts impact negatively. This is the case in all treatments.
While the contributions’ marginal welfare improvement is greater in the
treatments with a high effi ciency factor, the cost of effort is the same in all
treatments. However, a higher value of the group project, that is caused ce-
teris paribus by a greater effi ciency factor, also strengthens the incentive to
exert wasteful effort. So apparently, in the light of observed play being off-
equilibrium, it is not clear a priori whether the effi ciency differences across
treatments and the deviations from the theoretical predictions are driven by
contributions or efforts or a combination of both.
Figure 3 shows the decomposition of the net surplus over time in the
low effi ciency treatments. The circles represent the average surplus that
was created from contributions. Here we consider only the net surplus cre-
ation, which means that we deduct the opportunity cost of investing. In
the low effi ciency treatments each unit of contribution creates 0.6 units of
net surplus (i.e. φ − 1). The triangles depict the average surplus wasted
in the distributive contest, which is equal to average effort as effort causes
a unit cost. The difference between the circles and triangles is the average
welfare change caused by subjects engaging in investment and distributional
contest. In the case where the triangles are above the circles the difference
represents a welfare loss. When the circles are above the triangles, then we
have a welfare gain compared to a subject neither investing nor fighting. We
see that in both treatments the surplus creation from investment is quite
similar. In both treatments the surplus created starts at a similar level and
declines with time. The difference in effi ciency in the two treatments (as
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Figure 3: Net surplus in the low-effi ciency treatments
test. As one might expect, the amount of resources wasted is greater in the
case where there are no constraints. The welfare losses in earlier periods
in the unconstrained case are driven by high efforts over-compensating for
the surpluses. The gap between surpluses and efforts narrows over time, as
efforts decline more strongly than surpluses. In the constrained case average
surpluses are very similar to those in the unconstrained case. The slightly
lower efforts are the driving force behind the higher effi ciency compared to
the unconstrained case in early periods.
In the high-effi ciency treatments depicted in Figure 4, we observe much
higher surpluses created. This is caused by both higher investments and
by a higher net surplus per unit of investment (i.e. φ − 1 = 2). Also, the
surpluses (i.e. the contributions) do not decline sharply over time, as in the
low effi ciency case. Remarkably, the surpluses are very large in the uncon-
strained case, where standard theory would have predicted zero surpluses.
In the constrained treatment, where equilibria with positive contributions
exist, surpluses are lower though. Efforts follow the surpluses. Subjects
use more resources in the unconstrained case, where surpluses are higher.
Over-all the effect of very high surpluses in the unconstrained treatment





0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
constrained unconstrained









Surplus in the high-eff iciency treatments
Figure 4: Net surplus in the high-effi ciency treatments
case.
4.2.1 A closer look at contributions
Looking at the evolution of contributions (Figure 5) we see several inter-
esting patterns. In both conditions (i.e. constrained and unconstrained)
the contributions in the treatments with a high effi ciency factor on average
tend to be greater than in the corresponding treatment with a low effi ciency
factor. In addition, the treatments with the low effi ciency factor show a
downward trend, which is reminiscent to the decay of cooperation in public
goods games without distributional contests. In contrast, a high effi ciency
factor leads to stable investments. Moreover, subjects seem to be careful not
to exhaust their budget through contributions and to become defenseless in
the constrained treatments. This leads to contributions being higher in the
unconstrained treatments when compared to the constrained case with the
same effi ciency factor.
We also ran a random-effects regression with error clustering on inde-
pendent observations reported in Table 3 in the Appendix, which confirms
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Figure 5: Average contributions over time
4.2.2 A closer look at efforts
A closer look reveals that on average subjects’efforts are remarkably close
to the subgame-perfect continuation efforts. For given contribution levels
subjects chose on average efforts that are close to Nash.
Figure 1 plots actual efforts against the predicted subgame-perfect efforts
for the unconstrained treatments. We also depict a linear prediction (the
dashed line). Observe that in both treatments the linear prediction is very
close to the 45-degree line, which indicates that on average efforts were close
to the Nash prediction. In the low-effi ciency treatment the slope of the linear
prediction is very close to one (0.93 with a standard error of 0.01), while it
is slightly lower in the high-effi ciency treatment (0.85 also with a standard
error of 0.01). So on average subjects exert efforts close to those that are
subgame perfect. Recall that the subgame-perfect continuation effort is
exactly a quarter of the project value. In a somewhat crude statistical test
based on the independent observations we take the average ratio of effort
to the value of the project across all periods and subjects that form an
independent observation and compare these ratios to the equilibrium ratio
of 0.25 using a median test. In the low effi ciency treatment there is no






























Figure 6: Actual effort vs. Nash effort in the unconstrained treatments
difference for the high effi ciency treatment (p < 0.02, two-sided).
We obtain the same result if we use a more sophisticated econometric
model. We ran a multilevel panel regression model were we regressed effort
on an interaction between the value of the group project and the treat-
ment. In addition, we took into account that there might be unobserved
heterogeneity on the individual and on the independent observation level
by allowing for random coeffi cients on both levels. The estimated fractions
were 0.23 (Std Err = 0.01) in the low effi ciency treatment and 0.203 (Std.
Err. = 0.009) in the high-effi ciency treatment. Only the fraction for the
high-effi ciency treatment was significantly different (i.e. lower) than the
predicted quarter (p < 0.01). Figure 7 shows the distribution of individual
slopes we estimated. While it is clustered around the optimal value (i.e.
0.25) for the low effi ciency treatment, the individual ratios are slightly lower
in the high effi ciency treatment.
In the light of the result that we do not have over-dissipation without
constraints on efforts, one might expect to observe strong under-dissipation
in the case of constrained efforts. This is not the case. On average, efforts
are even closer to optimal efforts in the constrained treatments than in the
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Figure 7: Estimated individual effort/value ratios
actual efforts against Nash efforts. In the case of constrained efforts we
distinguish between observations, where subjects exhausted their remaining
budget for effort (light grey circles) and where they did not (dark grey cir-
cles). Again, we also plot the linear prediction, which here in both cases
almost coincides with the 45-degree line. This indicates that the average
actual effort is extremely close to the average Nash effort. The slopes are
0.99 in the low treatment and 0.94 in the high treatment with robust stan-
dard errors (clustered on individual observations) such that only in the high
effi ciency treatment the slope differs significantly from unity.16
4.2.3 Why is there no significant over-exertion of efforts?
The observation that subjects’efforts are close to the equilibrium, if not a
bit lower, are quite surprising, since most experimental studies with con-
tests report over-exertion of efforts (for recent surveys see Sheremeta, 2013;
Dechenaux et al., 2014). While many factors have been shown to influence
16These statistical inference results should be taken with a grain of salt. It is diffi cult to
develop a valid statistical test for the deviation from the optimal effort in the constrained






























Figure 8: Actual vs. Nash efforts in the constrained treatments
the degree of over-dissipation, its existence has proven very robust. For ex-
ample, groups over-dissipate more than individuals, and over-dissipation is
stronger with within-group punishment opportunities (Abbink et al., 2010).
The interaction of the feedback subjects receive and the nature of the contest
function (sharing versus stochastic winner-takes-it-all) has a strong impact
on efforts. Only in the share contest without information on the opponents
actions and payoffs over-dissipation disappears in latter rounds (Fallucchi
et al., 2013). Sharing contests — as in our case — yield efforts closer to
Nash equilibrium than lottery contest if cost are convex (Chowdhury et al.,
2014). Smaller endowments are another way to reduce over-exertion (Price
and Sheremeta, 2011). Over-exertion also exists in multi-stage (Sheremeta,
2010) and asymmetric (Fonseca, 2009) contest. Allowing subjects to form
alliances does not prevent excessive efforts (Ke et al., 2013). Moreover,
breaking up one grand contest into smaller sub-contests (Sheremeta, 2011)
or rationing the available effective effort (Faravelli and Stanca, 2012) does
not solve the problem. Neither does combing the contest with another de-
cision (Bayer and Sutter, 2009).
In our treatments with constrained effort subjects cannot over-exert ef-
forts, whenever the effort constraint is binding. In these situations any
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mistakes made by subjects necessarily are those of under-exerting. Together
with over-exertion in situations where the constraints do not bind, this plau-
sibly explains near Nash play on average. The finding that there is no over-
exertion on average in the unconstrained treatments is more interesting,
though. In what follows, we explore potential causes specific to our design.
One likely major cause is that we use a share contest, which eliminates extra
utility of winning or risk preferences as drivers of excessive efforts. Since this
is well documented (Shupp et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014), we explore
other possible causes. We have three potential influence factors in mind.
Firstly, if subjects are reciprocal then after observing contributions in the
first stage they may reciprocate with lower competitiveness in the second
stage. Secondly, the fact that subjects play a contribution stage before the
contest might put subjects in a cooperative frame of mind, which leads to
less aggressive behavior in the contests.17 Thirdly, an important difference
from other studies on contests is that we provide our subjects with a profit
calculator that calculates their share of the prize, cost and their net profit
for any combination of own and partner efforts they enter.18 If bounded
rationality is a major driver of over-exertion of effort then the calculator
should clearly reduce efforts.19
Reciprocity as a major reason for lower than expected efforts can be
excluded by looking more closely at the data. We use a random-coeffi cient
model (reported in Table 4 in the Appendix) with error clustering on in-
dependent observations to estimate the determinants of the slope of the
effort-prize relation. Somebody who is playing according to equilibrium
should have a slope coeffi cient of 0.25 which should be invariant to all other
variables. If subjects are reciprocal though, then the effort as a fraction
of the prize should decrease if the partner was generous in the contribu-
tion stage. We use the difference in the contributions as a fraction of total
contributions as a measure. This measure takes on the values one if only
the other player contributed, zero if both contributed the same amount and
minus one if only the person in question contributed. The coeffi cient on this
measure capturing reciprocity is very small and not significantly different
from zero.20
17Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013) found such spillovers when a cooperative and a com-
petitive game were played simultaneously.
18Mago et al. (2013) is to our knowledge the only other study that used some kind of a
calculator in experimental contests. There the calculator was not a profit calculator but
just a calculator for the winning probability though.
19Lim et al. (2014) and Sheremeta (2011) show that models of bounded rationality such
as Quantal Response Equilibrium or Cognitive Hierarchy predict over-exertion.
20For robustness we tried different measures such as dummies for having contributed
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In order to assess if the existence of the contribution stage puts subjects
in a more cooperative mind and leads to lower efforts, we ran an additional
treatment where the subjects (n = 30, recruited from the same population)
played only the contest stage. In order to make the contest comparable
across treatments we matched every subject in this new treatment with
one from the high_unconstrained treatment. We then let the new sub-
ject play exactly the same contests their match from the original treatment
had played (with the identical prize and residual endowments). So these
players played exactly the same contests as other subjects had played with-
out ever hearing about the existence of a contribution stage. The results
show that the hypothesis of a contribution stage putting subjects in a more
cooperative mindset cannot be supported. The coeffi cients estimating the
effort-value ratio in the aforementioned random-coeffi cient model are not
significantly different across the original and the treatment without a coop-
eration stage. Moreover, the distributions of estimated individual slopes are
not significantly different (KS test, p > 0.62). Furthermore, the mean slopes
estimated for the two different treatments are extremely close (i.e. 0.219 vs.
0.216).
Finally, we ran a treatment (two sessions with 38 subjects from the same
population) that was identical to the high-unconstrained treatment but with
the profit calculator removed. With this we can test the third hypothesis
which attributes overly high efforts to bounded rationality. We find that
subjects indeed expend higher efforts for given prizes if the profit calculator
is removed. The estimated parameter for the share of the prize invested
as effort is significantly higher without the profit calculator than in the
high_unconstrained treatment (p < 0.05). Also the average predicted indi-
vidual fraction of the prize invested as effort (i.e. the mean slope mentioned
above) is clearly higher without a profit calculator (i.e. 0.262 vs. 0.219).
A KS-test rejects the null hypothesis of identically distributed individual
slopes (p < 0.001). This shows that the profit calculator as expected re-
duces efforts significantly. However, the effect is quite modest and without
the calculator we still do not observe excessive efforts to the extent reported
in many other studies.
In summary, the lack of over-exertion of efforts is not caused by the
combination of cooperative and competitive stages. Our profit calculator
has been identified to cause lower efforts. The effect is not suffi ciently large
to explain the difference from other contest experiments. We conjecture that
the main factor driving the comparatively low efforts has been the use of a
more or less than the other but never obtained a significant coeffi cient.
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share contest instead of a lottery contest.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a simple model of cooperation and distributive conflict
and tests its predictions in the laboratory. The observed willingness of (at
least some) humans to cooperate, which contradicts standard theoretical
predictions, has interesting consequences in our environment. While coop-
eration increases social welfare in pure social dilemmas, we observe that for
a low social return it is welfare damaging if a distributive contests follows.
Subjects only learn over time that they are better off by not cooperating. In
situations, where the social return of cooperation is high, unpredicted but
observed cooperation improves welfare considerably. In both cases, with
high and low social returns, the welfare effect is dampened, when coopera-
tive investment and effort in the distributive contest have to come from the
same budget. The resulting reduction in efforts in the distributional contest
prevents an over-all damage of welfare in the case of low returns to cooper-
ation. In the high return case we observe lower levels of cooperation, which
leads to lower welfare gains than when efforts are unconstrained. This is
in clear contrast to the theoretical prediction that welfare is expected to be
weakly higher in the constraint case. This can be explained as follows. The
constraint allows agents in theory to overcome part of the holdup-problem,
as contributions reduce the amount of efforts left for fighting and therefore
make contributing worthwhile. At the same time contributions cannot be
too high as then agents would become defenseless in the contest. In the
unconstrained case players are predicted by theory not to overcome their
hold-up problem at all. In the experiments they do overcome the hold-up
problem though. Contributions are even higher, because there is no need
for keeping some of the endowment for the distributive contest.
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Proof. Suppose that ei = C − ci, then e∗j from above immediately follows
from (5). It remains to be checked if e∗i = C − ci is a best response to this.
It suffi ces to show that the unrestricted best response to e∗j is greater than
C − ci. Denote the unrestricted best response as BR. Then note that









− 1 ≥ 0 if ej ≤ V/4.
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It follows that if e∗j = C − cj then BR(e∗j ) ≥ C − cj ≥ C − ci → e∗i = C − ci.
It remains to check the case of e∗j =
√
φ(ci + cj) (C − ci) − (C − ci) .Note




4 (C − ci) (C − ci)− (C − ci)
≥ (C − ci) .
It follows that if e∗j =
√
φ(ci + cj) (C − ci)− (C − ci) , then BR(e∗j ) ≥ C −
ci → e∗i = C − ci.
A.2 Lemma 3





























which implies that for φ < 4 only ci = cj = 0 and for φ > 4 ci = cj =
2C/(2 + φ) are equilibrium candidates. So in the unconstrained region all
equilibria have to be symmetric.
Next consider the situation, where one player is constrained, while the
other is not. Without loss of generality assume ci > cj . Then we can write
the profit of the constrained player i as




j ) = φ (ci + cj)
C − ci
C − ci + e∗j
.
Substituting e∗j as calculated in (5) into the equation above yields






φ (C − ci) (ci + cj).
The marginal expected payoffchange ∂EUi(ci, cj , e∗i , e
∗
j )/∂ci has the same
sign as
C − 2ci − cj ,






The payoff of the unconstrained player j is given by




j ) = φ (ci + cj)
e∗j
C − ci + e∗j
− ci − e∗j
= C + ci(φ− 2) + cjφ− 2C −
√



















Since Equations (7) and (8) are not consistent with each other we can
rule out an asymmetric equilibrium with one constrained player.
It remains to be checked if an asymmetric equilibrium with two con-
strained players is possible. The payoff of a constrained player (conditional
on the other player also being constrained) is given by




j ) = φ (ci + cj)
C − ci
C − ci + C − cj
.











2C (2ci + cj)− 2C2 − (ci + cj)2
)
2C − ci − cj
= 0
→ c∗i (cj) = 2C − cj −
√
2C (C − cj) (9)
Checking the curvature shows that for a potential local maximum (for a
choice of ci) we require:
∂2
∂c2i






(ci + cj − 2C)3
≤ 0,
which is satisfied for interior ci and cj .
Taking (9) and subtracting the corresponding first-order condition for
player j yields √
2C (C − ci)−
√
2C (C − cj) = 0
→ ci = cj ,
which concludes the proof.
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A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. We can write the profit of player i depending on ci for player j








C + φci4 − ci if ci <
4C
4+φ√
φci (C − ci) if ci ≥ 4C4+φ
First observe that the payoff is continuous at ci = 4C4+φ . Then since the payoff

























→ ci > C/2 if φ < 4,
which implies that there is no profitable deviation from c∗i = 0 if cj = 0.
A.4 Proposition 4
Proof. In any symmetric equilibrium either both players are constrained
or they are both unconstrained. Taking the first-order condition for the
constrained case from (9) and setting cj = ci in order to restrict attention
to symmetric equilibria yields
ci = cj = C/2.


















Now suppose that player j chooses cj = C/2 and e∗j (ci, C/2).Then depend-
ing on the choice of i three different continuations are possible. First, both
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players remain constrained and reply with e∗i = C − ci, e∗j = C − cj . A de-
viation to an investment that does not remove the constraint for the second
stage is never profitable. This follows form the first and second-order condi-
tion in the proof for Lemma (3). Second i reduces ci such that he becomes











2 (4 + φ)
)
.
The continuation is e∗i (ci, C/2) =
√
C/2(C/2 + ci)φ−C/2 and e∗j (C/2, ci) =





j ) = C(3 + φ)/2 + ci(φ− 1)−
√
C(C + 2ci)φ












Note that the change increases in ci, which allows us to bound this change
in profit from below by setting ci = 0. The lower bound then becomes
φ− 1−
√
φ > 0 if φ > 8/3.
Therefore (and since the payoff is continuous at ci =
C(8−φ)
2(4+φ) ) a deviation
from ci = C/2 towards a lower investment that removes the own constraint
only is not profitable.















which is increasing for φ ≥ 4, which implies (as EUi is continuous at c =
C (4− φ) /2φ,) that for φ ≥ 4 the claimed equilibrium exists. For φ < 4 the
maximum payoff conditional on ci removing the constraints for both plays















→ φ > 8/3











Low_phi x period −0.372∗∗∗
(−14.99)




Age, maths, gender, study dummies Y es
N 8880
LR-test for random intercept vs. OLS p < 0.001
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 3: Panel regression for contributions
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effort
Treatment interacted with prize value, low is base
value 0.220∗∗∗
(13.21)
high x value −0.029∗∗
(−2.65)
high, no calculator x value 0.029
(0.96)
high, contest only x value 0.017
(−0.91)
Relative contributions interacted with value
∆-contribution x value 0.007
(1.15)
Age, maths, gender, study dummies x value Y es
N 6112
z statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001




Welcome to the experiment! Before we start, please read the instructions
carefully.
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points rather
than Dollars. Points are converted to Dollars at the following exchange rate
at the end of the session to determine your payment:
70 Points = AUD 1.00
You will be paid in cash immediately after the experiment. You are
not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will attend to
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you individually. Failure to comply with the outlined rules will result in
exclusion from the experiment and you will forfeit your payment.
Summary
After being grouped with a person who is randomly chosen by a com-
puter, you will play a two-stage game described in the experiment section
below. The game consists of two recurring stages. Both players’task is to
decide how much to invest in a group project in the first stage. Once the
project is completed both players’ task, in the second stage, is to choose
how much effort they would like to invest in an attempt to acquire a share
of the group investment. How much effort each player puts in determines
how the proceeds get split between both players.
The experiment
In what follows we will refer to the person you are playing with as your
’group member’. Both of you will be making investment and effort decisions
as follows
Investment stage
On the following page is a screen shot to familiarize you with how the
investment stage will appear on your screen
36
Your task is to divide your endowment (20 points) between what you
keep for yourself and what you invest in a group project. The other group
member has to do the same by choosing their investment at the same time
as you.
The value of the group project depends on your investment and the
investment of the other group member.
Once your investment has been made, you will be notified how much you
and the other group member have individually invested in the project. The
sum of your investments will be multiplied by 3 and that will be the total
value of the project for that round. This means that in every round:
Value of the project = 3 x (your investment + other group member’s
investment)
This concludes Stage A.
Distribution stage:
The following is a screen shot to familiarize you with what the distribu-
tion or effort stage will look like on your screen:
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In this stage of the experiment, your task is to determine an amount of
effort that you would like to invest in order to acquire a share of the group
project. Your group member has to do the same.
The more effort you put in for a given level of the other group member’s
effort, the larger will be your share of the project, however, the higher will
be your effort cost. On the other hand, the smaller your investment of effort
is for the given effort of your group member, the smaller will be your share
of the project, however, the effort cost you incur will also be low. The same
is true for the other group member.
As a guide, on the back of these instructions is a table attached which
represents values of percentage share of the project that you can expect to
get for any given values of your own and your group member’s effort.
In addition, you will be provided with a profit calculator on your screen
(as visible in the screen shot above) which you can use to calculate what
your expected profit will be for any combination of your own and the other
group member’s effort input.
Please note that the profit calculator is there only for your help. It does
not affect your final profit in any way. You can play around with it using
different values of effort for yourself and the other group member. You can
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then make your decision about what would be the optimal level of effort for
you to put in.
Your payoff
The total income you earn will be the sum of two parts:
1. Points that you keep (endowment - investment)
2. Your income from the group investment project.
Therefore, your total payoff at the end of each round is calculated and
recorded as follows:
Profit = (endowment - investment) + your share of the group project -
your effort
The other group member’s income is calculated in the same way.
This process will continue until 24 rounds have been played. In each
round you will be required to make two choices (investment into group
project and effort to acquire a share of the project). After the 24th round
your total profit will be recorded and you will be paid in cash.
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